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Abstract: 
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate why convergence is so difficult in the EU Monetary Union. 
My hypothesis is that Non-Negotiable Domestic Factors (N-NDFs) and Partially-Negotiable 
Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) play a pivotal role in both monetary Integration and Europeanization. 
N-NDFs are radically or irreducibly different from, while Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors 
(P-NDFs) are significantly different from the ones the EU dictates to its members.  
I apply these two concepts to redefine two well-known approaches. Looking at “flexible 
integration”, my hypothesis is that the UK, Denmark and Sweden failed to enter into the 
Eurozone because some Non-Negotiable leadership’ and citizens’ beliefs prevailed. With regard 
to “Uploading Europeanization”, Germany was only partly successful in uploading its Deutsche 
Bank system to the EU level because it was obliged to partially negotiate with other members its 
proneness to play as a leader in monetary policy.  
Furthermore, I use N-NDFs and P-NDFs to define two brand new processes. “Skeptical 
integration” refers to the cases of Italy’s and Greece’s dubious attitudes toward monetary union 
caused by Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) such as internal policy heritage that 
heavily constrained the Euro implementation. Finally, “Europeanized Integration” led to new 
members of Eastern Europe to obtain a successful entrance delay into the Eurozone because a 
lack of integration process brought to a forced and subsequently unsuccessful Europeanization, 
meaning that new members integrated in an already Europeanized context. Taken together, these 
four approaches synoptically explain rejections that occurred in the EMU by both old and new 
members. 
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Currently, only fifteen EU members out of twenty-seven have adopted the Euro. Numerically, 
this means that the Eurozone is slightly dominating in the “Non-Eurogroup”. The aim of this 
paper, therefore, is to investigate why convergence and Europeanization are so difficult in the EU 
Monetary Union. What explains differential implementation of monetary union between old and 
new EU member-states? Why did some old members react ambivalently, some ask for 
derogation, and others request an exceptional status? And, why did new Central and Eastern 
members obtain a postponement? To answer these questions, I assume that in the EMU, European 
integration, convergence and Europeanization theories alone are insufficient to elucidate the path 
and result of monetary union. On the contrary, I am proposing a critical revision of the theory that 
synoptically explains frequent rejections that occurred in the EMU by both old and new members. 
My central hypothesis is that in the EMU, Non-Negotiable Domestic Factors (N-NDFs) 
and Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors (P-NDFs)  play a pivotal role in both European 
Integration and Europeanization. N-NDFs are radically, significantly or irreducibly different from 
the ones the EU dictates to its members. N-NDFs win the competition against other powerful 
interests, which are organized at the EU level. With monetary union, the effects of N-NDFs 
reverberate in “Flexible Integration” and “Europeanized Integration”.  
On the other hand, Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) are significantly 
different from the ones the EU dictates to its members. In this case, thus, during integration the 
domestic actors mediating between the two levels are resistant to giving up domestic influence. 
However, these domestic constraints are balanced by counter-pressures coming from both internal 
and EU levels. Therefore, P-NDFs do not decisively win the EU proneness organized at the 
domestic level. As a result, the country decides not to completely abandon the integration path, 
but at the end, given the activity of multiple, divergent, or opposite forces, integration is 
weakened. I assume that prevalence of P-NDFs causes “Uploading Europeanization” and 
“Skeptical Integration”.   
In section four, I will examine mainstream literature, traditional actors, dynamics and 
relationships involved in “Uploading” European Integration and “Downloading” Europeanization. 
“Uploading” European integration coincides with the successful bottom-up creation of a 
supranational body of institutions, rules and procedures by the members of the European Union 
(EU). With integration, the independent actors are the states and the EU is the dependent one. 
Integration, therefore, corresponds to the definition of “the rules of the game” in terms of polity 
building and policy framing. Successful integration in monetary union was achieved in the 
majority of the old members.  
Recently, this path has been refined with an emerging attention on “downloading” 
Europeanization, the top-down domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or 
indirectly from EU membership. Under Europeanization, the EU is assumed to act as an 
autonomous actor, able to decisively shape policies, polities and politics of its member-states. 
Shortly, Europeanization means to “play the EU game”, representing a logical evolution after an 
intense phase of integration. In both “Uploading Integration” and “Downloading 
Europeanization”, domestic factors do not constitute an obstacle to the reception of EU policies. 
In effect, the majority of old members effectively opened their domestic doors to the input 
coming from the European Central Bank with reference to the common monetary policy. Both 
European integration and Europeanization reverberate in the concept of convergence, especially 
in the development of the monetary union. In the first section, I will clarify how the EU 
institutions planned the monetary union in theory, adopting a three-step approach toward 
convergence. Successively, I will review literature on convergence in the second section. 
Another theoretical framework linked with European integration and Europeanization is a 
peculiar institutional architecture defined as Multi-Level Governance (MLG) in which decision-
making competences are supposed to stand not only within state governments but also within  
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institutions and actors at other levels of government. I will present a bibliographic literature 
review on MLG in section three. In sum, MLG defines “where the game is played”. In the case of 
common monetary policy, the competence is supposed to be exclusively at the EU level, since 
that the management of the Euro is one of the EU’s communitarian pillars.  
My main contribution comes in section five, whose premise is the assumption that 
European integration and Europeanization theories are not capable of completely explain the 
enormous complexity posed by EU regionalism, especially considering the skeptical responses to 
the EU coming from its member-states. In fact, the different nature and degree of N-NDFs and P-
NDFs give way to a fluctuating and co-evolving (not only unidirectional) relationship between 
the EU and its members, both old and new. In this section, I will first define N-NDFs and P-
NDFs. Then, I will apply these two concepts to redefine two approaches already widely 
investigated in the literature on “Flexible Integration” and “Uploading Europeanization”. 
Furthermore, I will use N-NDFs and P-NDFs to create and define two brand new processes, 
named “Skeptical Integration” and “Europeanized Integration”. Taken together, these four 
approaches synoptically explain frequent rejections that occurred in the EMU by both old and 
new members. Finally, I will delineate the consequence of this critical framework for MLG 
theoretical apparatus and definition of convergence. 
The sixth section summarizes the methodology adopted to advance the research design. I 
specify a series of transversal indicators such as strategy toward the monetary union, the type of 
prevailing factor (N-NDFs or P-NDFs), specific kind of factors, and the domestic actors using it. 
These indicators will be applied to the illustrative cases in a comparative perspective. I will start 
the study of the cases in section seven, reviewing the theory of flexible integration with reference 
to the monetary union. In this regard, my hypothesis is that the United Kingdom, Denmark, and 
Sweden failed to enter into the Eurozone because some Non-Negotiable leadership’ and citizens’ 
beliefs prevailed. In these cases, the domestic actors mediating between the EU and the countries 
decided to opt out during the definition of the rules.  
Further, in section eight I will introduce the definition of “skeptical integration” looking 
at the cases of Italy’s and Greece’s dubious attitudes toward monetary union. According to my 
approach, these ambivalent attitudes toward the Euro were caused by Partially-Negotiable 
Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) such as internal policy heritage that did not prevent the adoption of 
the Euro but highly constrained its effective implementation. 
In section nine, I will present the unique case of “Uploading” Europeanization, referring 
to the German success of transferring the model of its central bank to the European Central Bank 
(ECB). Germany, actually, wanted to upload its Deutsche Bank system in terms of emulating its 
constitutional designs to the EU level. However, negotiations between Germany, France, and 
other members resulted in Germany being only partly successful in this enterprise because it was 
obliged to partially negotiating its domestic proneness to play as a policy leader in setting 
monetary policy.  
In the last section, before the conclusion, I will highlight other important cases in which 
Europeanization is made difficult by N-NDFs, which led to new members of Central and Eastern 
Europe to ask for and obtain a successful entrance delay into the Eurozone. I suggest that lack of 
integration process brought about a forced and subsequently unsuccessful Europeanization, thus 
causing almost all the new members to ask for a postponement of the Euro adoption. Lack of 
integration means that new members are required “to play the game” without participating in 
defining its rules during the 1990s, when they were not yet members of the Union. It indicates 
that downloading Europeanization forces new members to integrate in an already Europeanized 
context where the rules have been previously decided upon by other actors. In fact, they did not 
take part in “uploading” European integration that was managed solely by the old EU members. 
Therefore, asking for a postponement was the only option they had in redefining and negotiating 
“fit” and exercising some sort of power politics in bargaining with other members. 
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1.  Projecting the Monetary Union in Theory:  
The Three-Step Approach Toward Convergence 
 
 
The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the last step of a long path toward EU economic 
and monetary integration
3. The attempt of the Commission in 1961-1962 with the “Action 
programme for the second stage of the common market” was prior to the EMU 
4. Further, the 
Werner Report in 1970 expressed the “Member States’ political will to establish an economic and 
monetary Union” 
5. Finally, the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS), whose 
establishment was due to the political initiative of the French and the German governments, was 
defined as a “scheme for the creation of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe” 
6
The 1985 Single European Act (SEA) mentioned that monetary union should be a 
reachable goal of the European Community. However, the SEA did not plan how this could be 
achieved 
. The EMS included the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM), a system designed to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve monetary stability in 
Europe against the turbulence of the global currency market, especially caused by the swinging 
US dollar during Reagan’s presidency. The ERM was based on the concept of fixed currency 
exchange rate margins, but with exchange rates variable within those margins. 
7. A new debate among European policymakers toward the opportunity of a monetary 
integration started in 1988. This debate, ignited by the president of the Commission, Jacques 
Delors – and opposed by UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher -, shows how policies can be 
affected, if not initiated, by political leaders that strongly follow their political beliefs, personal 
expertise, individual culture, norms and ideologies, psychological traits, and cognitive skills. 
Delors’ intention was to further promote a monetary union through a three-stage process leading 
to a complete currency convertibility and an irrevocable fixing of exchange rates, together with 
some institutional arrangements and transitional requirements
8
In 1992, following Delors, the Maastricht Treaty (formally, the Treaty on European 
Union, TEU) established the EU, together with the second stage of the EMU 
.  
9. Technically, 
Maastricht provided some convergence criteria (also known as the “Maastricht criteria”) for EU 
member states to enter the third stage of the EMU and adopt the Euro
10
                                                            
    
3 For the historical evolution of the monetary integration, see Jones, Erik (2002). “The Politics of Economic and 
Monetary Union”, Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham, pag. 5 -11; Panarella, Alfredo (1995), “The Maastricht Treaty and 
the Economic and Monetary Union”, Leuven University Press, pag. 13 – 30. Dinan, Desmond (2005), “Ever Closer 
Union”, Rienner: Boulder, p. 77-79. Van Oudenaren, John (2005). “Uniting Europe”. 2nd ed. Rowman and Littlefield: 
Lanham, Chap. 6. 
    
4 Commission des Communautés Européennes (1962), “Mémorandum de la Commission sur le programme d’action 
de la Communauté pendant la deuxième étape, Chapitre VIII (politique monétaire)”, 24 Octobre 1962, Office des 
publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, No. 8067/1/XI/1962/5, Luxembourg. With this document, the 
commission inserted a chapter on monetary matters proposing to fix the exchange rates between European currencies 
together with the accumulation of an European reserve currency in preparation for the monetary union. 
    
5 Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of an Economic and Monetary Union in the 
Community (Werner Report), OJ [1970] C 94/1, and Bulletin of the European Communities 11/1970. 
     
6 Resolution of the European Council of 5 December 1978 on the establishment of the European Monetary System 
(EMS) and related matters. 
    
7 On the importance of the Single European Act for the monetary union, see Hix (2005). “Economic and Monetary 
Union”, ch. 10 in The Political System of the European Union, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005. 
    
8 “Report on economic and monetary union in the European Community (the Delors Report), para. 25; and Van 
Oudenaren, John (2005), “Uniting Europe”, 2
nd edition, Rowman and Littlefield: Lahnam. 
    
9  On the development of EMU, see Panarella, Alfredo (1995), “The Maastricht Treaty and the Economic and 
Monetary Union”, Leuven University Press, pag. 33 – 55; Van Oudenaren, John (2005), op. cit., pag. 206-227.    
. Then, as I will focus on 
   
10 The four main criteria are based on Article 121(1) of the European Community Treaty. The purpose of setting the 
criteria is to maintain the price stability within the EU even with the inclusion of new member states. The member who 
wants to adopt the euro need to meet certain criteria which include inflation rate (no more than 1.5 percentage points 
higher than the 3 best-performing member states of the EU); government finance (the ratio of the annual government  
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later, the whole process to achieve monetary union, which lasts a decade, can be depicted in terms 
of convergence. In the TEU, four underlying principles drive the EMU: first, subsidiary defines 
the balance of power in the union
11. Second, the principle of parallelism between economic union 
and monetary union, which can be seen on the whole as a principle emphasizing the “economic 
convergence” process as already declared by the Treaty Establishing the European Community 
(TEC) in 1957 
12. Third, the principle of cohesion was aimed to reduce developmental inequalities 
between richer and poorer regions within member states
13. Finally, the principle of irreversible 
progressivity, that is, the three scheduled steps, emanates from the first stage of the EMU that 
started in 1990, with the full liberalization of capital movements among members. The second 
stage began in 1994, characterized by the creation of the European Monetary Institute (EMI). The 
last stage initiated in 1999, consisted of the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
replacement of ERM by ERM II 
14
A number of studies examine the negotiations that occurred during monetary integration, 
a process that lasted more than a decade. Specifically, looking at the domestic political reactions 
and subsequent bargaining in the European debate shows that the setting of a common monetary 
policy was determined by politics
. With the third step, members decided to delegate irrevocably 
their monetary policy to the ECB. Finally, in 2002 creation and diffusion of the Euro came into 
effect. 
15
In 2004, a new chapter was written on monetary union, with the entrance of ten new 
members from Eastern Europe into the EU. In theory, the situation of new members is different 
from the one of the old members. In fact, new members have to accept all the provisions that 
come with entrance into the European Union, which includes mandatory adoption of the Euro. 
None of them have the possibility to opt-out, they are obliged to join the Euro-group according to 
. This feature, together with the determination of political 
leaders, characterized the early evolution of the EMU, with reluctant, skeptic and supportive 
positions. The reluctant UK government contested the political desirability of the EMU, followed 
by Denmark. As a result, a derogation status has been granted for the states that wanted to opt out 
from the EMU, following the principle according to which participation in the EMU cannot be 
imposed on any member state. Sweden, a member since 1995, has also deliberately chosen to stay 
out of the mechanism, thus maintaining their currency, the Swedish Krona. Sweden is expected to 
participate in ERM II in order to meet the convergence criteria required to adopt the Euro, but its 
exceptional status has been tolerated by EU institutions. Greece and Italy represent ambivalent 
cases. After an initial decision to opt out from the EMU, Greece decided to adopt the Euro. As a 
result, during the third step in 1999, the Greek currency was part of ERM II, and Greece has been 
part of the Euro-zone  since 2001. Not only Greece but also Italy deal skeptically  with the 
possibility to postpone its entrance into the EMU, due to lack of prerequisites. However, 
especially in the case of Italy, the Euro was intended as an “external tie” and to work as a tool to 
promote some urgent domestic reforms, allowing Italy to respect the timing scheduled. Finally, 
Germany, a leading member supporting the EMU, succeeded to transfer the model of its central 
bank to the European Central Bank. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) must not exceed 3% at the end of the preceding fiscal year); government debt 
(the ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year; exchange 
rate (applicant countries should have joined the exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) under the European Monetary 
System (EMS) for 2 consecutive years; long-term interest rates (the nominal long-term interest rate must not be more 
than 2 percentage points higher than the 3 best-performing member states.  
    
11   Art. G.5 TEU. 
   
12 Title II (arts 102 – 109), Part Three of the EEC Despite the interconnections between the economic and the 
monetary union, in this paper I take into consideration only the monetary union.  
   
13 Art 130A TEC, para. 2. 
   
14 Currencies in ERM II are allowed to float within a range of ±15% with respect to a central rate against the Euro. 
   
15 Among others, see Jones, Erik (2002). “The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union”, Rowman and Littlefield, 
Lanham. Dinan, Desmond (2005), “Ever Closer Union”, Rienner: Boulder,. Featherstone K., and Radaelli, C. (2003) 
“The Politics of Europeanization”, Oxford University Press.  
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the convergence criteria
16. However, negotiations between domestic and the EU level characterize 
not only the early, but also the latest evolution of the EMU, with the inclusion of new members. 
Specifically, new members have found room for negotiation with the aim of procrastinating their 
entrance into the Eurozone. As a result, of the ten new members, only Slovenia has adopted the 
Euro in 2007 and only small members Malta and Cyprus have adopted it in 2008. The absence of 
big names such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in the Euroclub is confirming that 
convergence is far from completely successful
17. Even Romania and Bulgaria, new members as of 
2007, are expected to convert to the Euro without a definite timetable
 18
2.  Theorizing Convergence in Monetary Union 
.  
The overall historical path depicted above on monetary union affects four theoretical 
apparatuses intertwined among themselves, which are theories on convergence, MLG, European 
integration and Europeanization. To clarify the use of these terms, I assume that convergence and 
MLG can be used as indicators of European integration and Europeanization. Convergence and 
MLG are analyzed in the following two sections, while traditional actors, dynamics and structure 
on “Uploading” European integration and “Downloading” Europeanization will be outlined in the 
fourth section. 
 
This section outlines the theoretical apparatus on convergence that logically followed the crafted 
convergence by real EU policy makers. For many commentators, the chapter on the EMU 
included in the Maastricht Treaty represents the most significant event in European integration 
since the signing of the Rome Treaties in 1957
19
The EMU represents a clear case of policy change for the EU members. Initially, within 
the dynamic of regional integration, the EMU designers proposed and propelled the EMU through 
a convergence process. However, in real terms, members have adopted multiple strategies to cope 
with  the  EMU convergence criteria. Looking at the theoretical lineaments on convergence, 
Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) with the other contributors of their book, use some institutional 
explanatory concepts such as domestic adaptation, cross-national convergence, policy transfer and 
“goodness to fit”. These concepts depict brand new processes in policy homologation within the 
EU, which is defined as a complex entity with its own nature, mixing international, supranational 
and intergovernmental features
. The EMU has been particularly important 
because it introduced the idea of convergence, a process that will be adopted by the EU to 
promote integration in other policy areas. Also, the EMU represents one of the first examples of 
European integration and subsequent Europeanization; this means that the EU has an effective 
role in directing and pressuring its members toward policy, procedures and goals. Finally, the 
EMU is particularly important for multi-level governance due to, at least, two prominent reasons: 
first, it presupposes a transfer of sovereignty in monetary policy from national authorities to 
supranational institutions; secondly, it provides a new concept of a central bank, called to manage 
an entirely fiduciary currency.  
20
                                                            
   
16 The EU institutions tolerated UK’s, Denmark’s and Sweden’s opt out from the Euro but the Commission has stated 
it would not be indulgent on any future members attempting the same route. Then, opting out became a procedure that 
the EU was obliged to ban for future new members. 
   
17 The Estonian Kroon, Lithuanian Litas, and Slovenian Tolar were included in the ERM II in 2004; the Cypriot 
pound, the Latvian lats and the Maltese lira on 2005; the Slovak koruna on 2005. The currencies of the three largest 
countries which joined the European Union on 1 May 2004 (the Polish zloty, the Czech koruna, and the Hungarian 
forint) are expected to follow eventually, without a precise timetable. 
   
18 Bulgaria enjoyed ERM II membership in the beginning of 2007 and adoption of EMU is predicted for 2010. 
Romania plans to join ERM II in 2010-2012, while adoption of EMU is not scheduled with a precise timetable. 
   
19 J. V. Louis, “Perspectives of the EMU after Maastricht”, in Stuyck ed., Financial and Monetary Integration in the 
European Economic Community – Legal, Institutional and Economic Aspects, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 
Deventer 1993,     pp. 5. 
   
20 Featherstone K., and Radaelli, C. eds. (2003) “The Politics of Europeanization”, Oxford University Press. 
. Notwithstanding, among these institutional explanations that 
are in competition or partially overlapping, particularly persuasive is the “goodness of  fit”  
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approach elaborated upon by Börzel and Risse to explain successful policy implementation, a 
situation that occurs when there is homogeneity between the domestic institutional framework 
and the European one. In the EMU, this approach works better in the German and French cases, 
when the two countries tried to upload their respective central bank models to the EU level during 
the earlier negotiations 
21
Literature offers other insightful theories on convergence. For Knill, convergence is “an 
increase in the similarity between one or more characteristics of a certain policy [...] across a 
given set of jurisdictions [...] over a certain period of time. Policy convergence, thus, describes the 
end result of a process of policy change”. Knill argues that convergence is a causal mechanism 
provoked by imposition, international harmonization, regulatory  competition or transitional 
communication and Europeanization
. 
22. Furthermore, Holzinger and Knill distinguish among 
degree, direction and scope of convergence. This configuration applies to many concepts familiar 
to the study of public policy such as imposition, international harmonization, lesson-drawing, 
transnational problem-solving, and emulation
23. Falkner et al., (2005) argue that in social policy 
and labor law, only moderate convergence can be detected because the members partially 
implement the EU directives. Even if they are not interested in measuring convergence, 
translating their intuition to the EMU opens the possibility to measure quantitatively monetary 
convergence  through a scale  in terms of low, moderate, significant or full convergence. In 
addition, Jordan addresses an interesting methodological article on convergence, underlining the 
necessity to better define the problem of causality with a more precise definition of the variables 
under investigation. In fact, for him, the implementation of EU policy can be studied with a 
cumulative body of research designs dealing with the concepts of isophormism, policy transfer, 
and new modes of EU coordination
24. Finally, in line with my hypothesis on Non-Negotiable 
Domestic Factors affecting Europeanization, Lenschow, Lieffering and Veenman develop a 
framework for analyzing domestic factors (culture, tradition and economy) behind policy 
diffusion and convergence
25. They confirm the “Family of Nations” idea that countries that are 
culturally, traditionally and economically closer are expected to adopt similar policy solutions 
26
Another theoretical apparatus linked with European integration and Europeanization reflected by 
the EMU is Multi-Level Governance (MLG). This section, initially presents theories on MLG and 
later it focuses on literature looking at the connections between MLG and the EMU. Both 
European integration and Europeanization reverberate not only in convergence but also in a 
peculiar institutional architecture defined as Multi-Level Governance (MLG). This crossroads 
denotes an intersection between comparative policy and international relations because European 
integration and Europeanization are closely related to policy formulation processes, while MLG is 
referring to the debate on the second image and the second image reversed. Since the 1990s, the 
EU government has been defined as multilevel and interdependent. In such an environment, MLG 
is defined as the intertwined policy formation processes at three levels: the subnational (the 
. 
 
3.  Multi-Level Governance (MLG) and Monetary Union 
                                                            
   
21 Goodness to fit has been elaborated in two separated articles. Börzel, T. and Risse, T. (2000). “When Europe Hits 
Home: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, in European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 4, 015; and Börzel, T. 
and Risse, T. (2003). “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”, in Featherstone and Radaelli eds., The Politics 
of Europeanization, Oxford University Press. 
   
22  Knill, C. (2005), “Introduction: Cross-national Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory 
Factors.” Journal of European Public Policy 12: pag. 768. 
   
23 Holzinger, K. and Knill C. (2005), “Causes and conditions of cross-national convergence”, in Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 12, N. 5 (October), pgs. 775 – 796; 
   
24 Jordan, A. (2005), “Policy Convergence: A Passing Fad or a New Integrating Focus in European Union Studies?”, 
Journal of European Public Policy 12: 944-953; 
   
25 Lenschow, A., Duncan L., and Sietske V., (2005), “When the Birds Sing. A Framework for Analyzing Domestic 
Factors Behind Policy Convergence”, Journal of European Public Policy 12: 797-816. 
   
26 See F. Castles (1993). “Families of Nations”, Brookfield, NH: Dartmouth.  
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micro-regions within the states) the domestic (the various member-states) and the supranational 
(the EU institutions).  
In line with MLG theory and practice, states are required to play the role of co-policymakers 
and/or policy implementers. On the other side, the EU is supposed to be able to effectively drive 
policymaking, especially in areas where it is exclusively competent. Moreover, Micro-regions within 
the state are relatively free to search for representation at the EU level, in order to search for funds and 
legitimation as political actors. MLG is continuously shaped by different dynamics: In this way, trends 
to decentralization of agenda setting and devolution work well when there is symbiosis between the 
two levels of analysis providing the development of collaborative patterns.  
MLG was first used by Marks in 1993 to capture developments in the European integration 
after the Single European Act (SEA) in 1988
27. Drawing from the policy networks approach in 
domestic politics, Marks defined MLG as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers”
28. He further notes that within MLG “supranational, national, 
regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks”. For 
Hooghe and Marks, MLG does not imply that central governments are no longer important
29; rather it 
contends that central governments are no longer the only institutions that control decision-making. 
Fundamentally, multi-level governance implies that the making of public decisions is dispersed across 
multiple territorial levels. Further, according to Marks and Hooghe, the core argument of MLG is that 
“governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture the variations in the territorial reach of 
policy externalities” 
30
Looking at the EU, Marks and Hooghe propose a model in which institutions, such as 
international, national, regional, and local authorities, perform general-purpose functions in a multi-
level governance system. Driven by general-purpose, these institutions perform several functions, 
including a number of policy responsibilities. This model, then, is concerned with power sharing 
among actors operating at a limited number of levels. Applying the concept of multi-level governance, 
to EU decision making, Marks notes that in MLG, subnational actors are important in the EU, leading 
to three tiers of decision making- national, supranational, and subnational. Principally, in the EU, 
MLG has been used to denote the presence of various institutions that affect public policy in the EU 
member countries
.  
31. Other studies have also outlined some benefits of MLG. Pollack and Majone 
argue that multiple jurisdictions can facilitate credible policy commitments
32. For Weingast, multiple 
jurisdictions allow for jurisdictional competition
33. To Gray, it facilitates innovation and 
experimentation
34
Literature on the EMU grasps MLG theory in various degrees. Despite the empirical problems 
and theoretical criticisms that will be depicted later, the EMU is particularly important for at least two 
prominent reasons: first, it presupposes a transfer of sovereignty in monetary policy from national 
authorities to supranational institutions; second, it provides a new concept of a central bank, called to 
manage an entirely fiduciary currency. In this way, the EMU can be inscribed in the path that Radaelli 
.  
                                                            
   
27  Marks, Gary (1993). “Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC.” in Alan Cafruny and Glenda 
Rosenthal, (eds).,The State of the European Community, New York: Lynne Rienner, pag. 391-410. 
   
28 Marks, Gary (1993), op. cit. pag. 392. 
   
29  Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001). “Multi-level Governance and European Integration”. Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers. 
   
30 Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001), op. it., pag. 16. 
   
31 These institutions are the European Commission (EC) , European Parliament (EP) , the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) , the central governments of member countries, and the provincial and state governments in federal and quasi-
federal member countries of the EU. 
   
32  Pollack, M., (1997). “Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Community,” International 
Organizations, 51:99-134. Majone, Giandomenico (1998). “Europe's `Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards”, 
European Law Journal, 4:1:5-28. 
   
33 Weingast, B., (1995). “The Economic role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 11: 1-31. 
   
34 Gray, Virginia (1973). “Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study.” American Political Science Review, 67: 
1174-85.Gray, Virginia (1994). “Competition, Emulation, Policy Innovation”, in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson 
(eds.), New Perspectives on American Politics, 230-48, Washington: CQ Press.  
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defines as Europeanization of public policy 
35
Here it is important to note that when looking at the monetary union, MLG works only in two 
main contexts: the national context of individual countries (the European states) and the context of 
European Union one. With reference to the EMU, MLG is strongly correlated to the relationship 
between the European and the domestic levels, with little importance accorded to sub-national actors 
like local communities. This is because the monetary policy, before the EMU, was in the hands of 
domestic national governments and regulated by independent agencies such as the central banks. In 
this system of competences, scarce room was accorded to the local actors, such as provinces, regions, 
or lands. Consequentially, with the aim to develop a common monetary policy, the EMU defined a 
new system of competences in which territorial actors were not involved
. This means that the influence of MLG in European 
politics and public policy means that members experience some reduction of their influences in their 
domestic environment. In a policy area like the EMU, MLG should encourage institutional reform and 
sovereignty shift from the domestic level to the European one. In the EMU, then, only the 
supranational level of authority (the European Central Bank) is exclusively responsible for addressing 
monetary policy. This intuitively explains why member-states are not affected uniformly by the EMU, 
even if it was supposed to regulate a common monetary policy. Especially looking at the old members, 
this fragmented response is caused by different preferences among member states, able to circumvent 
necessities of institutional change promoted by the EMU. This means that non-negotiable domestic 
interests decisively influence decision making in several countries on domestic issues. 
36
A common denominator is that the EMU promotion within the EU is depicted as a process in 
which the policy process is determined by politics
.  
37. On this point, Falkner et al write “the process of 
designing and implementing EU law is political”
38
Cameron traces the emergence of new European organization structures in the monetary 
realms, adopting an economic explanation of MLG
.  Similarly, Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) 
demonstrate that Europeanization of policies is a political-driven process. However, many theories 
portray MLG from different perspectives, looking at economic factors, institutional legitimation, and 
actors’ behaviors.  
39. He argues that member-states perceived the 
necessity to create new institutions at the supranational level to better serve their interests. Like 
Cameron, Jones analyzes the EMU in terms of an economic goal led by political processes 
40. 
Idiosyncrasy is the concept used by Jones to define the controversies that have surrounded the creation 
of the EMU, because “the politics of EMU [...] varies from country to country and from one situation 
to the next”
41
According to Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, Europeanization is the “emergence and the 
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” 
. The author argues that divergences toward the EMU embraced the significance of the 
broad change instilled in the member-states and the EU, made more difficult by the coexistence of 
different actors, interests, institutions and time.  
42
                                                            
   
35 Radaelli, C. (2003). “The Europeanization of Public Policy”, in Featherstone K., and Radaelli, C. (2003) “The 
Politics of Europeanization”, Oxford University Press. 
   
36 However, further studies might explore and find cases in which local levels played a major role in defining old 
domestic monetary policy and subsequently in EMU, if any. 
   
37 Jones, Erik (2002). “The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union”, Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham. Dinan, 
Desmond (2005), “Ever Closer Union”, Rienner: Boulder,. Featherstone K., and Radaelli, C. (2003) “The Politics of 
Europeanization”, Oxford University Press. 
   
38 Falkner, Gerda et al., (2005). “Complying with Europe”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge/New York. 
   
39 Cameron, David (1998). “Creating Supranational Authority in Monetary and Exchange-Rate Policy: The Sources 
and Effects of EMU”, in Stone Sweet and Sandholtz eds. European Integration and Supranational Governance, Oxford 
University Press: Oxford. 
   
40 Jones, Erik (2002). “The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union”, Rowman and Littlefield, 
Lanham. 
   
41 Jones, Erik (2002). Op cit., pag. 1. 
   
42  Green Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, (2001),  “Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change”, 
Cornell University, Ithaca, pag. 23. 
. Featherstone notes that the 
EMU has changed the political agendas of national governments and has created a new institutional  
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framework at the EU level
43. All the steps towards the EMU have been characterized by a political 
legitimation. However, for Featherstone the situation is complicated by the necessity of double levels 
of legitimation (at the national and European ones) and actors’ legitimation (citizens, technocracies, 
elites). On the same field, Hix approaches the EMU as a policy-making area by reviewing the political 
science literature. In doing this, he underlines the institutional division of competences in the EMU 
between the EU and its member-states
44. Goetz and Hix, finally, analyze the EU as a political system, 
looking at the way its actors and institutions work
45
In this section, I illustrate and define the actors, dynamics and the nature of the relationships involved 
in both the European integration and Europeanization. The traditional bibliography on “uploading” 
European integration posits the bottom-up creation of a supranational body of institutions, rules and 
procedures by the members of the European Union (EU).
. Actually, policy outcomes depend on preferences 
and institutions. Policy competences between the EU and its member-states are analyzed in terms of 
constitutional settlement with a separation between exclusive competences of the EU, shared 
competences between the EU and its members, coordination competences, and exclusive competences 
of the member-states. 
 
4.  Traditional Actors, Dynamics and Relationships on “Uploading” European Integration 
and “Downloading” Europeanization 
 
46
                                                            
   
43 Featherstone, Kevin (1999). “The Political Dynamics of the Economic and Monetary Union”, in Cram et al. eds. 
Developments in the European Union, St. Martin Press. 
   
44 Hix (2005). “Economic and Monetary Union”, ch. 10 in The Political System of the European Union, 2nd ed. New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2005. 
   
45 Goetz, K., Hix, S. (2000) “Europeanised Politics?: European Integration and National Political Systems”, Frank 
Cass & Co., London; Hix, S. (2005). “The Political System of the European Union”, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s 
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150  –  160; Lindberg, N. (1971), “Political integration as a multidimensional phenomenon requiring multivariate 
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refined with an emerging attention on “downloading” Europeanization, the top-down “domestic 
adaptation to the pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership” 
47
Figure. 1 – Structure, actors and dynamics in regionalism between the member states and the European 
Union. Adaptation from Borzel 
. In integration, 
the independent actor is the state and its supranational intentions to create the EU, the dependent actor. 
In Europeanization, the EU is assumed to be an autonomous actor, able to shape policies, polities and 
politics of its member-states. The conventional relationship depicting actors (member-states and the 
EU), “Uploading” and “Downloading” dynamics and the nature of the relationship on European 
Integration and Europeanization is presented in the following table. 
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– 352; Fawcett, L. (2004), “Exploring regional domains: a comparative history of regionalism”, in International Affairs, 
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“Uploading” Integration 
“Uploading” European integration is the bottom-up creation of a brand new supranational body of 
institutions, rules and procedures by the members of the European Union (EU). It is the definition 
of “the rules of the game”. In integration, the independent actors are the member-states and the 
EU is the dependent actor. The successful accomplishment of an uploading supranational path of 
politics (“full integration”) represents a crucial step in the process of achieving politico-
institutional homogeneity, economic performance, legal framework, and cultural convergence. 
Featherstone suggests that the identification of domestic inputs keen on the EU policy process 
properly equates to the notion of integration
49
In the creation phase, as well as in the subsequent phases, a member-state opens a third 
decisional level, the supranational policy that expands its area of responsibility. That is, with the 
regional project, the states have to set their decision according to three levels of policies 
(domestic, regional and foreign) that correspond to three different stages of the IR system 
(national, supranational, and international). In this way, the  supranational delegation of 
sovereignty cannot be considered a form of masked foreign policy because in the latter, the states 
do not delegate sovereignty, while in the former they delegate sovereignty to the regional level. 
This implies a different ontology associated with a different sphere of action. Then, regional 
integration is changing Putnam’s two level system and Gourevitch’s second image reversed
. The EU integration process is combining in a 
brand-new way the external projections and the internal factors of its member. It departs from the 
nation-state level, but it is not merely internal. It represents a bottom-up flow, but it is not a mere 
external factor. Integration is characterized by a double dynamic: on one side, the horizontal 
integration in terms of (relatively) free flows of people, goods and services in the region, due to 
the economic policy coordination among members. In this scheme, further, a second coordinate 
can be identified in the vertical integration between multiple levels of governance, the sub-
national, the national and the supra-national.  
Full integration is made possible by the activity of some intermediate actors bridging and 
mediating between domestic and supranational politics. In integration, the action of intermediate 
actors is analyzed with a multi-perspective focus, in terms of institutions, economic interests, and 
lobbying groups (neo-liberalism), norms and identities (constructivism), balance of power 
(realism), leadership perceptions and ideologies (the statist school). In integration, the missing 
approach is the societal one, because integration is supposed to be an elite-driven process. Hix 
identifies a plethora of domestic actors who are responsible for the EU policy process activation, 
like political parties, interest groups, domestic and European elections, and public opinion. 
Finally, the Council, being essentially formed by national governments, is  more willing to 
accommodate member states’ interests than those of EU. Another sphere where heads of 
governments unite, the Council is pivotal is the definition of the treaties, the long-term rules 
under which EU policies have to be delivered. 
50
Technically, integration can be considered as an institutional reconfiguration requiring 
new model engineering, widely analyzed by two schools. Theoretically, researchers appear 
divided in two schools of analysis: on one hand, intergovernmentalists consider the EU as an 
international regime constituted by national interests and preferences in a bargaining game not 
. 
                                                            
   
49 Featherstone K., and Radaelli, C. (2003), “The Politics of Europeanization”, Oxford University Press. 
   
50 See Putnam, R. (1988), ” Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, in International 
Organization, 42, 427-460 and Gourevitch, P. (1978), ” The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of 
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different from the one in the International system
51. On the other hand, supranationalists see the 
EU as a quasi-federal system, with its own nature, in neo-functionalist terms 
52
To better define the phenomenology of regionalism, then, new concepts have been developed by 
the new school: regionness and region-state. Hettne and Soderbaum argue that regioness is the 
process through which a pre-region zone is achieving its regional awareness or consciousness, a 
path leading to a pan-regional identity and culture
.  
Successful integration in monetary union means that the majority of member states met 
the convergence criteria in time to launch the single currency in 1999, corresponding to the stage 
III of the EMU. These countries are Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, 
Austria, Luxembourg and Ireland. Greece failed in 1999 but succeed in 2001. However, in this 
list I exclude Italy and Greece  because they will be considered cases in which “Skeptical 
Integration” prevailed in implementing the monetary union because of some Partially-Negotiable 
Domestic Factors (see page 28). Further, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden are 
excluded due to their political decision not to join the monetary union at its launch. They invoked 
their “opt-outs” under the Maastricht Treaty,  appealing for their right to use “Flexible 
Integration”. In these cases, Non-Negotiable Domestic Factors prevailed (see page 26). Moreover, 
Germany as well is excluded because it represents the unique case of “Uploading” 
Europeanization, due to its success to “copy-paste” the model of its central bank system to the 
European Central Bank, although with limits (see page 30). Finally, new Central and Eastern 
Europe members obtained a postponement of their entrance into the monetary union, without a 
definite timetable. My hypothesis, explained on page 32, is that their lack of participation in the 
integration stage during the 1990s –  because they were not members –  constitutes the main 
political reason of their delaying. In this sense, they were forced to a kind of “Europeanized 
Integration” with any power to decide about the rule of the game.  
 
Region-State 
53; for Bayliss and Smith, the individuation of a 
region through a “growing interdependence between geographically contiguous states” is an 
important process, because there is no “natural region”
54. For Hettne and Soderbaum, regioness 
can be understood in analogy with concepts such as “stateness” and “nationness” 
55. According to 
Hix, the EU is a new political system without the classic apparatus of a state
56
Considering the increasing level of complexity developed in the EU since the 1990s with 
a renovated effort on political integration, scholars consider the EU as a prominent structure able 
to provoke effects into the member states. This actor has been named as a region-state, a supra-
national entity voluntarily created by sovereign states, after a successful phase of intense 
regional-building. Region-state is defined by Ohmae “as an area developed around a regional 
economic center in which governments have a vital interest in propagating and enforcing the 
values of inclusiveness” 
. In this sense, it 
embodies a government that does not have the monopoly of political activity, shared with its 
member-states. 
57
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“constitute a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national communities into a 
new form of political entity” 
58. Stubbs underlines the geographic factor, while Katzenstein 
defines region-state as a concept dependent on a series of ideal, linguistic, political, social and 
cultural factors
59. For Schmidt, a region-state is “a union of states in which the creative tension 
between the Union and its member-states ensures both ever-increasing regional integration and 
ever-continuing national differentiation”
60
According to Hix and Goetz, studies on Europeanization are different from studies of 
European integration in terms of their analytical focus. On one side, studies on integration stress 
the process of institution-building at the European level. On the other side, an emerging approach 
is paying attention to the influence of supranational framework on the domestic politics of 
member states. Similarly, Risse, Cowles and Caporaso address their attention to “why, how and 
under what conditions Europeanization shapes a variety of domestic structures in a number of 
countries”
.  
 
“Downloading” Europeanization 
“Downloading” Europeanization is the top-down domestic adaptation to the pressures emanating 
from EU membership. It means “to play the game”. In Europeanization, the EU is assumed as an 
autonomous actor, able to shape policies, polities and politics of its members. In this sense, 
Europeanization is a systemic approach that evaluates the impact of the EU on the domestic 
politics of its members because of the growing importance accorded to the EU as a region state, 
able to operate actively in a number of domestic policies, polities and politics. Then, after the 
initial state intention to transfer some pivotal policies at the supranational level (integration), now 
the region-state is able to cause some domestic repercussions in terms of policy adaptation by 
member states. As a result, in full Europeanization it is correct to assume that the EU is the 
independent actor, and the member-states the dependent one.  
61
Featherstone and Radaelli define Europeanization as a “domestic adaptation to the 
pressures emanating directly or indirectly from EU membership”
. 
62. It means that Europeanization 
is a policy process that refers to the mediating role of the European Union in mutating domestic 
institutions, networks, political cultures and public policy within its members. Further, Radaelli 
discusses the concept of Europeanization looking at the impact of the EU politics and policies on 
the member-states
63. He proposes  a  taxonomy for both theoretical and empirical  purposes, 
underlying the differences among  Europeanization, convergence, harmonization,  and political 
integration. According to Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, finally, Europeanization is the “emergence 
and the development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” 
64
Full Europeanization is analyzed in terms of agents and processes. Looking at the first 
factor, intermediate actors facilitating or hindering Europeanization are formal structures (state 
institutions, national legal systems, regional administrations, etc.) as well as informal structures 
(leadership beliefs and perceptions, relationship between government and business, public 
discourses, national identities, citizenship) 
.  
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. Risse, Green Cowles and Caporaso argue that, 
whether or not a country addresses its institutional structure to Europe depends on the presence or  
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absence of mediating factors. They posit five mediating factors: multiple veto points in the 
domestic structure, facilitating formal institutions, a country’s organizational and policymaking 
cultures, the differential empowerment of domestic factors, and learning
66
Analyzing the processes, in successful Europeanization, scholars focus on the notion of 
change in the nation-states
. 
67. In this regard, the literature identifies some intermediate processes 
in terms of domestic adaptation, cross-national convergence, or policy transfer
68. Particularly 
successful has been the “goodness of fit” approach, a situation that occurs when there is 
homogeneity between the domestic institutional framework and the European one
69
 
Figure 2 - Conventional relationship with actors in European Union and Europeanization processes.  
 
.  
When “Downloading” Europeanization is successful, EU policies enter in the domestic 
realm of its member-states. In the monetary union, among the old members this happened 
everywhere with the exception of the “opting out” states (UK, Denmark and Sweden). Looking at 
the new members, only Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus adopted the Euro, while all the other states 
obtained a postponement. 
    
The Nature of the Conventional Relationship 
At this point, it is epistemologically important to define the structure in which the actors and their 
dynamics described above act. As said before, in the bibliography the traditional approach to full 
integration posits the states as the independent actors and the EU as the dependent result; this 
results in a bottom-up dynamic. Further, the growing literature on “Downloading” 
Europeanization argues that the conventional relationship is the opposite, with the EU being the 
independent actor and the states being the dependent one, with a top-down stream as a result. It 
derives a conventional relationship that is depicted with the following chart. 
 
This relationship is correct when both European integration and Europeanization are 
successful. Overall, it depicts a logical and consequential process in which member-states first 
integrate themselves into the EU, and secondly they are willing to play the EU game, adapting 
domestically to its inputs. In the case of monetary union, European integration was pursued with 
the inter-governmental bargain and, effectively managed with supranational method by the 
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European institutions. However, this crucial logic is not universal because it does not have an 
explanatory leverage posed by the difficulty of integration and Europeanization toward the 
monetary union. These difficulties, depicted above, have significant repercussions on 
convergence and MLG theories. These important empirical problems call for a critical revision of 
the conventional wisdom that I explain in the following section. 
 
5.  The Pivotal Role of N-NDFs and P-NDFs in European Integration and 
Europeanization 
 
Considering the empirical problems that occurred with convergence in the EMU and other policy 
areas, a developing body of literature is creating theories that put under discussion (criticize) the 
nature of the relationship involved in integration and Europeanization, with significant 
repercussion on convergence and MLG. In effect, a plethora of studies suggests that in this model 
there is not an exact relationship between European integration and Europeanization. As a 
consequence, scholars see a spurious relationship between European integration and 
Europeanization 
70. For many scholars, in fact, the difference between the two processes is not 
clear-cut. For Olsen, the European regionalism is constituted by multiple and coevolving 
processes in which the setting of dependent and independent variables is complex
71
To answer all these questions, my central hypothesis is that in the EMU, Non-Negotiable 
Domestic Factors (N-NDFs) and Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) play a pivotal 
role in both European Integration and Europeanization. N-NDFs and P-NDFs are one set of 
interests playing a crucial role in the contemporary nation state. In addition, N-NDFs and P-NDFs 
. The result is 
a continuous linkage between the national and European models, making the distinction between 
integration and Europeanization porous. 
Why in monetary union the  path to integration and Europeanization was not 
straightforward? And how does it influence theorization on convergence and MLG? The UK, 
Denmark and Sweden “opted out” from integration and subsequently did not europeanize their 
domestic monetary systems; dubious Italy and Greece skeptically accepted integration. This means 
that the path to monetary union was difficult even for states that followed the logic of “integration 
first” and “Europeanization later”. Further, almost all new Central and Eastern member-states obtained 
a postponement of their entrance in the Eurozone. Here, I assume that these new member-states were 
forced to europeanize without participating in the previous step of integration. This illogical and 
paradoxical dynamic is echoed by an oxymoronic definition that I call “Europeanized Integration”. 
Even the case of Germany’s “Uploading Europeanization” of its central bank to the EU level offers 
insightful reflections. In sum, these cases denote that the whole project is more complicated than 
depicted by the traditional relationship explained above, in which member-states are pivotal in 
integration and the EU plays as main actor in “downloading” Europeanization. 
What explains differential implementation of Monetary Union across old and new EU 
member-states? Why did some old members react ambivalently, some ask for derogation and 
others request an exceptional status? And, why did new Central and Eastern members obtain a 
postponement? To answer these questions, I assume that in the EMU European integration, 
convergence and Europeanization theories are insufficient to elucidate the path and result of 
monetary union. On the contrary, I propose a critical theory that synoptically explains frequent 
rejections that occurred in the EMU by both old and new members. 
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have to compete with other powerful factors, which are organized at both the domestic and EU 
level. Cases supporting the effect of both N-NDFs P-NDFs will be presented in the following 
sections.  
Non-Negotiable Domestic Factors (N-NDFs) are radically or irreducibly different from 
the ones the EU dictates to its members. More specifically, I assume that the common 
denominator bringing to flexible integration and Europeanized integration is the prevalence of N-
NDFs. It means that N-NDFs decisively prevail on opposition factors organized at the domestic 
and EU levels. With N-NDFs, domestic actors are able to set their boundaries, maintaining their 
ability to set political rules, establish norms, enforce regulations and guide public processes 
against or ignoring the EU. Here, it is important to note that they do not reject the whole EU 
project but only a specific policy area or issue. 
On the other hand, Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) are significantly 
different from the ones the EU dictates to its members. In this case, thus, during integration the 
domestic actors mediating between the two levels are resistant to giving up domestic influence. 
However, these domestic constraints are balanced by counter-pressures coming from both internal 
and EU levels. Therefore, P-NDFs do not decisively win the EU proneness organized at the 
domestic level. As a result, the country decides not to abandon completely the integration path, 
but at the end, given the activity of multiple, divergent, if not opposite forces, integration is 
weakened. I assume that prevalence of P-NDFs causes “Uploading Europeanization” and 
“Skeptical Integration”. 
N-NDFs and Flexible Integration 
 
What happens when N-NDFs prevail in integration? The answer to this question shows that 
predominance of the domestic level is also evident in a second path defined as a “flexible integration”, 
or “variable geometry integration”, or “external empowerment”, a path that happens when a particular 
rule, procedure or institutional matter of discussion is irreconcilable with its N-NDFs. As a result, the 
member-state voluntarily interrupts the cycle toward Europeanization, deliberately failing to achieve 
it. Flexible integration has been already investigated in the bibliography, but my contribution is to 
define this concept within my framework, considering it as a result of N-NDFs 
72
 
Figure 3 - Relationship with actors and dynamics in flexible integration.  
   
. In flexible 
integration, the domestic actors mediating between domestic and EU levels do not participate in the 
definition of the EU rules because they voluntarily decide that they do not want to Europeanize in a 
particular policy area. In this sense, the interrupted arrow in the table denotes this dynamic. As a 
result, they will not be under the pressures coming from Europeanization. Three cases embody this 
dynamic in monetary union: The United Kingdom’s, Denmark’s and Sweden’s opting out from the 
Euro (see page 26). The dynamic is depicted in the following table.  
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P-NDFs and Skeptical Integration 
 
What happens when P-NDFs prevail in integration? I assume that prevalence of P-NDFs causes 
“Skeptical Integration” and “Uploading Europeanization”. In skeptical integration, member-states in 
which P-NDFs prevail act as independent actors unwilling to promote further integration, as in the 
case of N-NDFs. However, the domestic pressures of other actors pushing for further integration 
counterbalance the anti-EU position, with the result that the integration path for that country is not 
interrupted. In the next scheme, the broken arrow denotes an accomplished but skeptical integration. 
Italy’s and Greece’s dubious implementation of the Euro not followed by adequate structural reform 
represents two examples in which P-NDFs caused an unconvinced adoption of the Euro (see page28). 
 
 
Figure 4 - Relationship with actors and dynamics in skeptical integration. 
P-NDFs and Uploading Europeanization 
  
“Uploading Europeanization” is a process that occurs during uploading integration in which P-NDFs 
play a major role. The reason whereby uploading Europeanization coexists with uploading integration 
is not contradictory because in upward Europeanization, during the definition of the EU rules and 
institutions, a member-state tries to transfer to the European level one of its institutions. This happens 
because the member does not want to get rid of sovereignty or a successful institution which is 
performing particularly well in its domestic realm and thus could be considered as an example to be 
adopted in the EU. Departing from this premise, the member tries to “copy-paste” its institution to the 
EU, claiming its “goodness of fit”
 in the EU 
73
 
Figure 5 - Relationship with actors and dynamics in Uploading Europeanization.  
. In this model, the “leading member” acts as the sole 
independent  player, while the other states and the EU are the dependent players. However, the 
inevitable confrontation with other members leads to a negotiation that does not block the leading 
member from uploading its model but imposes some restrictions. In this way, the initial intention 
propelled by the leading member becomes partially negotiable. The overall result is downloading 
Europeanization, this meaning that the EU frames policies through an institution built upon a model 
picked from one of its members. In the EMU, this approach works especially with Germany that was 
able to upload its central bank model to the EU level during the earlier negotiations, notwithstanding 
some resistance of other members (see page 30). 
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N-NDFs and Europeanized Integration 
 
Finally, I suggest that the prevalence of N-NDFs is a situation that can also occur in downloading 
Europeanization. In this sense, I examine how N-NDFs organize themselves to oppose policies 
coming from the EU. Europeanized Integration espouses the view that Europeanization alone 
cannot adequately explain the evolution of the European Union especially with regard to new 
Central and Eastern members. Here, as shown in table 5, I assume that in a given policy area new 
member-states perceive that they are forced to Europeanize because they did not participate in the 
previous step of integration, they were not members as yet at that time. Once members, however, 
they consider the opportunity to exercise their negotiation power eventually opposing 
Europeanized policies that do not fit with their domestic realms and that they did not participate 
in deciding. In this sense, Europeanized Integration is an oxymoronic definition capturing this 
illogical and paradoxical dynamic involving new member-states. In Europeanized Integration, 
therefore, the domestic actors mediating between the two levels are not able – or not willing – to 
accommodate in the domestic sphere the inputs coming from the region-state, playing a pivotal 
role in redirecting the strategic choices posed by Europeanization. 
Every failure or delay in Europeanizing like Europeanized Integration creates problems in the 
entire process that cannot be considered an isolated exception, or lack of domestic adaptation, or an 
undesired externality or a mere disagreement with the dictates coming from the EU as a region-state. 
Therefore, with Europeanized Integration I suggest a fluctuating and co-evolving (not only 
unidirectional) relationship between EU and its members in Europeanization. Europeanized 
Integration demonstrates how N-NDFs can reverse the direction of the relationship in 
Europeanization, when the State is the independent actor able to shape the EU. The best example of 
Europeanized Integration involves almost all new Central and Eastern member-states (with the 
exception of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus) that obtained a postponement of their entrance into the 
Eurozone. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Relationship with actors and dynamics in Europeanized Integration. 
A Synoptic View of the Relationships 
 
Table 6 summarizes the nature of the new relationships explained above. The chart shows the unit of 
analysis,  the independent and the dependent actors in the EU regionalism. The result is a new 
synthesis of the whole process, with the state at the center of the stage for two reasons. Looking at 
integration, the predominance of the domestic level is demonstrated in many ways. In integration, per 
definition, states set the rules of the games, no matter if they fully integrate, have a skeptical attitude 
due to prevalence of P-NDFs,  or decide to opt out because of N-NDFs. Furthermore, the 
predominance of the domestic sphere is real in Uploading Europeanization  and Europeanized 
Integration. On the other hand, only in Downloading Europeanization is the EU able to lead policy 
setting. In the following section, this synoptic approach will be applied to empirical cases of monetary 
union. 
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The Units of Analysis  The Independent Actor(s)  The Dependent Actor(s) 
Uploading Integration 
Member – States 
 
The European Union 
 
Flexible Integration 
Skeptical Integration 
Europeanized Integration 
Uploading Europeanization  One Member – State 
Other Member-States 
 
The European Union 
Downloading Europeanization  The European Union  Member - States 
Figure 7 – The unit of analysis, the independent and the dependent actors in the EU regionalism.  
Critical Theories on Europeanization 
 
The concept of Europeanized Integration moves in the direction of investigations on 
unsuccessful or critical Europeanization. In effect, there is growing critical literature showing 
that states are far from a “stateless EU”, with states sometimes still rejecting a submissive 
attitude to the EU. In this sense, Busch provides useful suggestions about the condition under 
which Europeanization does not affect domestic policy patterns in banking systems
74. 
Further, looking at Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), Fouilleux and Cini analyze how 
domestic change inducted by the EU can be limited if it goes against the preferences of 
national intermediate actors who have the capacity to resist 
75
In fact, looking at the Europeanization of old members, Falkner et al. critically 
approach it from a legal perspective, confirming that “one-size-fits-all are neither politically 
feasible nor normatively desirable” 
. This critical literature reflects 
on the equilibrium, the reciprocal position and the direction of the dynamics between the two 
entities under investigation, that is to say, the member-states and the EU.  
76. The concept of legal harmonization within the EU is 
hindered by the need of required flexibility asked by members’ governments. Even 
Featherstone and Radaelli who optimistically define Europeanization as a “process of 
structural change variously affecting actors and institutions, ideas and interests” 
77, admit a 
possibility of a minimal response in terms of policy inertia or economic retrenchment by the 
member-states to the political pressures coming from the EU 
78
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contributions, Dyson underlines the different strategies placed on the  EMU by domestic 
elites, examining the creation and negotiation of the 1991-2 EMU agreement and looking 
particularly to the domestic policy-making of its leading members
79
Considering critical Europeanization in new members, Goetz adopts the “family of 
nations” cultural perspective to criticize convergence and Europeanization of policy-
making
. In the EMU, policy 
convergence is seen as dependent upon the fluctuating interactions between 'top-down' and 
'bottom-up' dynamics. For Dyson, the result is a “differential Europe” or “elusive 
Europeanization”.  
80. He develops a critical approach, looking at cases in which non-convergence is 
caused by territorial and temporal constraints. Goetz defines national trajectories along 
different criteria, individuating the North-Western core of founding members, with Southern, 
Central and Eastern European countries, making only possible a mere “clustered 
Europeanization”.  Grabbe argues  that Europeanization operating in applicant countries is 
characterized by an asymmetry of power, because they are subject to pressures without the 
possibility to influence EU policy-making from the inside
81. As a result, new Central and 
Eastern members act under the effect of “uncertain Europeanization”. Finally, Dyson, in a 
pivotal contribution, looks at the difficult entry of East-Central Europe into the Eurozone, 
characterized by political strategies developed to temporally delay their entry into the 
monetary union
82
Before the presentation of the cases, I clarify how the complex system of the relationships 
involved in integration and Europeanization have significant repercussions on convergence 
and MLG. Members asking to opt out, skeptical members searching for derogation and new 
members asking for procrastination made the real process more fragmented than expected by 
policy makers. As a result, then, one of the most interesting analytical results of this 
fragmentation has been the development of critical convergence and critical MLG theories. 
Therefore, following this discussion, it can be observed that in the EU it is not difficult to find 
N-NDFs that impede cultural, institutional and economic integration and Europeanization, 
destabilizing also convergence in the direction of policy fragmentation in both in theoretical 
and empirical terms
. As a result, “paradoxical Europeanization” is defined as a dynamic in 
which Europeanization is extreme but limited, causing uncertainty in the convergence 
process and institutional reform. 
 
Critical Theories on Convergence and MLG 
  
83
In this regard, Jordan provocatively asks if policy convergence is a real and effective 
process followed by an enduring study agenda by EU scholarship or a debatable passing 
.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
demonstrating how Non-Negotiable societal vetoes can reverse the direction of the relationship in Europeanization, 
being the State the independent actor, not the EU. 
   
79 Dyson, K., (1994), “Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe”, Longman, London; 
Dyson, Kenneth (2000) “EMU as Europeanization: Convergence, Diversity and Contingency”, JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 38 (4), 645–666; Dyson, Kenneth ed. (2002). “European States and the Euro: 
Europeanization, Variation and Convergence”, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. 
   
80  Goetz, Claus (2006). “Territory, Temporality and Clustered Europeanization”, Institute for Advanced Studies, 
Political Science Series, Vienna. 
   
81 Grabbe, Heather (2002), “Europeanisation Goes East: Power and Uncertainly in the EU Accession Process”, paper 
for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Turin 22 – 27 March.  
   
82  Dyson, Kenneth (2007). “Euro Area entry in east-central Europe: Paradoxical Europeanisation and clustered 
convergence”, in West European Politics, 30:3, 417 – 442. 
   
83  Knill, C. (2005), “Introduction: Cross-national Policy Convergence: Concepts, Approaches and Explanatory 
Factors.” Journal of European Public Policy 12: pag. 768.  
 
25 
25 
fad
84. With reference to the old members,  Börzel creates a typology of member state 
responses to policy convergence
85. For her, states are more likely to engage in “pace-setting” 
when they try to actively push their domestic policies and institutions at the EU level. 
However, the other two typologies express all the problems about partial convergence. “Foot-
dragging” is exactly the opposite of pace-setting, because it is aimed to contain the attempt of 
other states to upload their domestic policies to the EU level. Finally, “fence-setting” is an 
ambivalent strategy, mixing indifferent, inertia or neutral attitudes toward policy 
convergence. With regard to the problems that occurred with the recent enlargement of new 
Central and Eastern members, Dyson proposes the concept of clustered convergence, that is, 
in the EMU convergence is visible only in groups of countries, such as the Baltic states, the 
Visegrad States, and Slovenia
86. With clustered convergence, Dyson analyzes  multiple 
sources of uncertainty among members, such as geo-strategic differences, diverse economic 
structures, different legacies from Communist era, difficulties to conform to the convergence 
criteria, and the role of political parties and structure of political competition. Furthermore, 
Tumple-Gugerell and Mooslechner underline the risk that policy convergence in a 
geopolitical periphery like Central and Eastern Europe, where countries have economically to 
catch up with respect to the core members, might become a divergence, or, at least, nominal 
convergence 
87
6.  The Structured Focused Comparison for the Study of the Illustrative Cases 
. 
In Europe not only convergence, but also the emergence of an MLG system (EU, 
states, states/regions, and local communities) call for innovative ways of collaboration and 
coordination among actors. In this way, MLG, European integration and Europeanization 
correctly understand these dynamics ahead of trends of the decentralization of agenda setting 
and devolution. Following the MLG logic, in supranational policies like the monetary union, 
states are decentralized actors whose role is to implement policies dictated at the EU level 
especially by the European Central Bank.  
However, with the critical dynamics explained above, the symbiosis between MLG, 
European integration and Europeanization is at risk, because the development of 
collaborative patterns is not always clear. To this regard, much less recognized is member-
states recentralization, provided by N-NDFs and P-NDFs that act as centrifugal forces 
leading to elusiveness in terms of level of competences. In this way, intricate patterns of 
MLG are not consolidating but, on the contrary, disappearing. MLG can be obstructed by N-
NDFs and P-NDFs in integration, during the setting of the rules, and Europeanization, during 
the implementation of the rules. Therefore, if MLG efficacy is limited by N-NDF, then a 
theory on limited or fragmented MLG might become a predominant –  and not solely a 
secondary order explanation – explaining the problematic functioning of the EU system.  
  
 
In the last sections, I take into consideration cases in monetary policy where effects that the 
members caused to the EU because of their defense of N-NDFs and P-NDFs in European 
Integration and Europeanization are evident. in which it is evident the effects that the 
members caused to the EU because of their defense of N-NDFs and P-NDFs in European 
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Integration and Europeanization. In approaching the study of the cases, I use the “method of 
structured focused comparison” developed by George and Bennett, with the identification of 
a series of transversal questions/indicators that I have listed below in the following chart 
88
Member  
State 
: 
Q1: What member-state? Q2: What strategy did it adopt toward monetary union? Q3: In 
which time frame? Q4: In which process? Q5: What type of domestic factors prevailed? Q6: 
What is the nature of the domestic factor? Q7: What domestic actor promoted the factor? 
 
Strategy toward 
monetary union 
Time 
Frame  Process  Type of 
Factors 
Nature of 
Factors 
Domestic 
Actors 
UK 
Opting Out 
1992     
−    
now 
Flexible 
Integration 
N-NDFs 
Leaders 
Beliefs  
Governments 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Citizens 
Beliefs  
Society 
Italy     
Greece  Ambivalent  1992   
−   
1999 
Skeptical 
Integration 
P-NDFs 
Policy 
Heritage 
Parties, 
Bureaucracy 
Germany  Leading 
Uploading 
Europeanization 
Goodness 
to fit  Governments 
Central      
and Eastern   
Members* 
Postponement 
2005 
−    
now 
Europeanized 
Integration  N-NDFs  Lack of 
Integration  Governments 
Figure 8 – Structured and focused indicators for the comparative studies of the cases. 
   * With the exception of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus 
 
To validate my hypothesis, in the following section I will analyze two examples provided 
by two old members where predominance of N-NDFs causes flexible integration. I specifically 
analyze the United Kingdom’s, Denmark’s and Sweden’s opting out in 1992 from monetary 
union. N-NDFs provoking flexible integration were leadership beliefs within various 
governments in the case of the UK and society beliefs in the cases of Denmark and Sweden. 
Looking at skeptical integration, in section eight I present the cases of Italy’s and Greece’s 
dubious attitudes toward monetary union. According to my approach, these ambivalent attitudes 
toward the Euro were caused by P-NDFs like policy heritage resistant to reform promoted by 
parties in Italy and inefficient bureaucracy in Greece. Section nine will be dedicated to the 
presentation of the partial German  success in the enterprise of uploading its Deutsche Bank 
model to the European Central Bank because Germany was obliged to negotiate its domestic 
proneness to act as a policy leader in setting monetary policy. 
In the final section, I will highlight a case in which Europeanization is made difficult by 
N-NDFs, which led to new members of Central and Eastern Europe asking for and obtaining a 
successful entrance delay into the Eurozone. I suggest that the lack of an integration process 
brought about a forced and subsequently unsuccessful Europeanization. Therefore, asking for a 
postponement was the only option they had in redefining and negotiating “fit” and exercising 
some sort of power politics in bargaining with other members. 
                                                            
   
88  George and Bennett (2005), “Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences”, BCSIA,               
Cambridge. On the necessity to compare taking into consideration some qualitative dimensions, they follow 
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During the definition of the rules in 
monetary union, the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden made a political decision not to join 
the Euro at its launch. Denmark and the UK 
invoked their opt-outs under the Maastricht 
Treaty, while Sweden decided just not to 
join. These members decided to stay out, 
due to the obstinate prevalence of some 
different N-NDFs. In opting out, N-NDFs 
provoking flexible integration and impeding 
subsequent downloading Europeanization 
are leadership beliefs in the case of the UK 
and society beliefs in the cases of Denmark 
and Sweden. Thus, the nature of N-NDFs is 
dissimilar, but the result is the same. 
The United Kingdom’s opting out  since 
1992 from the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) is a case in which Non-Negotiable 
national leadership perceptions and 
ideologies were able to affect the EU in the 
delicate process of monetary integration. 
These Eurosceptic positions have historic 
roots that can be  individuated in the 
European Monetary System (EMS) 
established in 1979. EMS had success in 
maintaining stability in the exchange rates of 
the system and reducing inflation within 
states. However, the United Kingdom, 
France and Italy criticized the centrality of 
the prominent position of the Deutschmark 
in the EMS, creating asymmetries within the 
EMS and constraints at the domestic level. 
They had good reasons, because the United 
Kingdom Sterling (and the French Franc 
indeed) especially was  strong  in  the  world 
 
7.  When Non-Negotiable Domestic Factors Prevail in Flexible Integration: The Case of 
UK’s, Denmark’s and Sweden’s “Opting Out” from the EMU 
 
 
 
 
 
currency system and able to survive and compete independently. Despite these criticisms, a new 
debate started at the beginning of 1988, due to the intention to promote further monetary union. 
Especially in Great Britain, more tensions grew in June 1988 after the statement provided by 
German governmental elite reemphasizing the centrality of Deutschmark in the EMS 
89
At that time, Great Britain’s conservative and “Eurosceptic” government led by Margaret 
Thatcher was experiencing an internal crisis caused by the opportunity to enjoy the monetary 
union because the launch of the EMU required new policy agendas in national government, the 
. 
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Figure 9 – Actors, N-NDFs and dynamics in  
flexible integration.  
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promotion of some actors to the detriment of others, and a new institutional architecture for 
the states. Thatcher strongly disagreed with the EMU because it was considered premature 
90. 
Specifically, domestic pressures to stay out of the Eurozone were defined by the executive in 
terms of domestic “flexibility” on monetary policy and credibility of the government 
91. As a 
result, London in 1989 proposed a parallel monetary architecture with two currencies - one 
hard and one soft - that did not find any support among other states 
92. Then, in 1992 during 
the negotiation on the Maastricht treaty that the EMU proposed, her government secured the 
possibility to exercise opt out from the stage in which the single currency would be 
established 
93
A number of studies examine the creation and negotiation of the 1991-2 Economic 
and Monetary Union agreement, looking particularly to the domestic policy-making of its 
leading members 
. 
94. Not surprisingly, John Major’s Eurosceptic government that followed 
Thatcher decided to maintain this general orientation. However, the election of the Labour 
Government led by Tony Blair in 1997 renovated hopes for an opening of the UK to enjoy 
the EMU but his chancellor Gordon Brown declared that the government would “wait and 
see”, following a politics of “catch-up”, because the UK was not ready for the EMU 
95. At the 
end of the Labour’s second term, no referendum was held on this issue. As a result, the 
suspicion of leadership that extending powers to supranational institutions would lose 
political support at the domestic level caused Great Britain’s conditional engagement in the 
EU 
96
The UK’s opt out cannot be considered only an exception because other states such as 
Denmark and Sweden adhered to it, according to a mechanism named “spillover”
. This implies that the UK policymakers had found a number of indirect means to 
influence monetary policy-making in the Eurozone but never wanted to get rid of their 
domestic currency, deliberately rejecting the Europeanization of UK’s monetary policy. 
97. They 
decided to opt out after they held referenda on Euro membership in 2000 and 2003. Due to 
negative results in the referenda, they are unlikely to join the Euroclub in the near future. The 
Danish and Swedish citizens’ refusal to ratify monetary union is a domestic input coming 
from society obstinately defending some N-NDFs. Swedish citizens in 2003 rejected 
membership despite an enthusiastic campaign promoted by its government, especially in rural 
areas, where voters were most unfavorable to the Euro 
98
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out in exploiting a legal loophole by not working to meet the criteria to join, and hence not 
being able to adopt the currency, as it is obliged to 
99
Also, the Danes voted narrowly in a referendum in 2000 to stay outside. Differently 
from the UK, in Denmark the political elite was firm in recommending entry, however the 
result  was a resounding rejection. Danish society, in fact, was worried about the 
consequences of a common currency on social security with fear of cuts in social welfare. 
Furthermore, they wanted to protect their national identity and sovereignty against the 
prominent role of neighboring Germany in managing the Euro, not wanting to appear as a 
mere satellite state of it 
. 
100
8.  P-NDFs Prevalence in Skeptical Integration: Italy and Greece Between the 
EMU as an “External Tie” and Lack of Structural Reform 
.  
 
 
 
   
In the early 1990s, immediately after its creation, the EU was increasingly preoccupied with 
the capacity of the applicant to fulfill the accomplishment of its policies
101
  For Italy, the constraints imposed by the monetary union were particularly difficult 
for three reasons: an institutional “lack of fit”, Italy’s highest public debt among the members 
at that time and the presence of powerful parties against reforms 
. The constraints 
imposed by the EU were particularly impervious for Italy and Greece due to their historical 
“lack of fit”. As a result, Italy and Greece reacted ambivalently toward the monetary union. 
In effects, Italy’s and Greece’s uncertain implementation of provisions coming with the Euro, 
not followed by adequate structural reform,  represent  two examples of “skeptical 
integration”. These dubious attitudes toward the Euro were caused by Partially-Negotiable 
Domestic Factors (P-NDFs) such as internal policy heritage promoted by powerful parties 
and oriented against reform. These constraints did not prevent the adoption of the Euro 
because other domestic actors intended monetary union as an endogenous pressure (“external 
tie”) to decisively promote Euro adoption. 
102. On the EMU, Italy 
maintained a skeptical position essentially due to internal political institutions’ resistance to 
any reform and because of a disastrous fiscal policy 
103
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. On the institutional side, Italian 
management of public finances has been conditioned more by  coalition governments  (the so   
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called “partitocrazia”, power to the 
parties)
102. Parties showed little interest in 
limiting the deficit, ignoring any 
institutional opportunity to reduce the 
public debt 
103. In fact, in the Italian 
parliamentary system, the Prime Minister is 
institutionally weak and could do little to 
enforce fiscal discipline 
104.   
As a result, Fabbrini says that 
Italy’s path to the EMU has been paved by 
adjustment processes characterized by 
schizophrenic governments’ turnover 
associated with the lack of fundamental 
institutional reforms and the adoption of a 
“copying mechanism” 
105. 
Another school affirms that Italy was able 
to gain advantages by turning the risk to be 
excluded by the monetary union into the 
possibility to promote domestic reforms 
106. 
In this sense, during the phase of 
bargaining rules of the EMU, Italy’s fears 
of having little chances to maintain the 
rhythm of the other members toward a 
deeper integration has been strategically 
turned upside down by Italian technocratic 
leadership that interpreted the inevitability 
of the EMU as a stimulus to domestic 
reform and modernization, restraining the 
indiscipline of parties and their clientelism
 
105. Basically, these actors were influential 
public-finance core decision-makers with 
no formal links to the parties but executing 
important macroeconomic strategies for the 
country 
106. In a state with little bargaining 
capabilities in the EMU  due  to  a  weak 
national currency (the Lira), the domestic 
the inevitability of the EMU as a stimulus to 
domestic reform and modernization, 
restraining the indiscipline of parties and 
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Figure 10 – Actors, N-NDFs and dynamics in 
skeptical integration.  
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interpretation of the EMU as an external tie enabled a better macroeconomic policy and 
regulatory reforms 
109. External tie is considered by the integration scholarship as a case of 
external empowerment, because technocratic elites interpreted the EMU as an inevitable and 
endogenous source able to promote domestic reform. In sum,  external tie  worked as a 
strategic opportunity used by regime-dependent players such as technocrats to annihilate 
other domestic actors, i.e. powerful Italian parties were forced to negotiate and rectify their 
initial opposition 
110
Not only Italy but also Greece skeptically deal with the possibility of postponing its 
entrance into the EMU, due to lack of prerequisites. After an initial decision to opt out, in 
1999 Greece in fact adhered to ERM II, in 2000 it qualified for the monetary union and 
finally it  has been part of the Euroarea since 2001. However, using rational choice 
institutionalism, Featherstone, Kazamias, and Papadimitriou emphasize that  Greek 
technocrats’ attempted to use the EMU as a strategy for domestic reform but failed especially 
because of bureaucratic fragmentation, weakness of supporting “advocacy coalition” and 
embedded clientelism 
. In a sentence, for Italy, reform-oriented technocracies and the 
concomitant resistance of P-NDFs accomplished a limited external empowerment with the 
formal adoption of the Euro within the allotted time frame but it was accompanied by a 
substantial lack of domestic reforms to cope with it. 
111
During this negotiation step, in monetary union there was room for a unique case of 
“Uploading” Europeanization, referring to the German success to transfer the model of its 
central bank to the European Central Bank (ECB). Germany, a leading member supporting 
the EMU, uploaded its Bundesbank system in terms of emulating its constitutional designs to 
the EU level. However, negotiations between Germany, France and other members show that 
Germany was successful only in part in this enterprise because it was obliged to partially 
negotiate its domestic proneness to play as a policy leader in setting monetary policy.   
  There are some reasons according to which Germany promoted its central bank 
system as a model for the EU. Firstly, Germany did not want to lose the advantages of having 
a strong currency like its Mark searching for monetary adventures in the EU 
. These domestic actors acted following some P-NDFs leading to a 
slow adaptation process toward the Euro. Italy experienced a similar outcome, therefore 
skeptical integration might be depicted as the Southern European countries way to cope with 
the EMU. 
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. Secondly, 
the EMU is almost contemporary to two other parallel processes: the delicate reunification of 
Germany  in 1989-90 and the  decisive evolution  from the  European Community (EC)  to the  
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European Union (EU) in 1992, with the 
Maastricht treaty. Therefore, the EMU 
offered to a recently reunified Germany in 
the recently born EU the possibility to play a 
role of regional leader in economic and 
political realms. Thirdly, another institutional 
explanation refers to the “goodness to fit” 
approach elaborated by Börzel and Risse to 
explain successful policy implementation, a 
situation that occurs when there is 
homogeneity between the domestic 
institutional framework and the European 
one 
111. Under the EMU, this approach works 
better in the German and French cases, when 
the two countries tried to upload their 
respective central bank models to the EU 
level. 
For Bulmer and Padgett, although the 
EU is an optimal platform for policy transfer, 
in reality stronger forms of policy transfer 
occur in more highly institutionalized 
governance regimes, like Germany 
112. 
Looking at cultural explanations and policy 
inheritance, Dyson stresses the importance of 
Ordo-liberal domestic ideology, that 
promoted the EMU as a convergence 
process, i.e. the Europeanization of the 
German model of economic stability, while 
at the same time searching for a new role for 
the Bundesbank with less powers 
113.  
France acted willingly to share 
monetary power with Germany, challenging 
the idea of a Germany-driven ECB and 
showing its reluctance to lose its domestic 
sovereignty in monetary policy 
114. process, 
i.e. the Europeanization of the German model 
of economic stability, while at the same time 
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Since the beginning, in fact, the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS) was 
due to the political initiative of the French and German governments that defined it as a “scheme 
for the creation of closer monetary cooperation leading to a zone of monetary stability in Europe” 
117. More recently, France also took advantage of the German call to collaborate toward a 
monetary union, because otherwise, for German Chancellor Helmut Kohl an EMU without 
France would not make sense 
118. Consequently, Dyson notes that the negotiation ability of 
French policymakers asking for extra conditions in the negotiation process occurred along the 
three steps. Another reason explaining France’s predominant resistance in opposing Germany is 
that in the EMU, the “goodness to fit” worked well in France too 
119. In this sense, Howarth notes 
that French governments tended to interpret the EMU as an extension of French state activity at 
the EU level together with the defense of its domestic monetary interests 
120
In conclusion,  the pressure from France and other members was able to dilute the 
predominance of Germany in monetary policy-making 
. Finally, France 
could also count on the support of other members like the UK and Italy, which were not 
particularly enthusiastic about the idea of a “Bundesbank-cloned” monetary regime. 
121. In effect, the negotiations among them 
show that domestic factors – in this case partially negotiable – play a major role in “Uploading” 
Europeanization. As a result, Germany represents the unique case of “Uploading” 
Europeanization in monetary union, but its success to “copy-paste” the model of its central bank 
system to the European Central Bank has been constrained by negotiations with other members, 
especially France. For Jones, the EMU reflects a change in the Franco-German relationship, 
notwithstanding difficult negotiations during and after the EMU implementation 
122. In fact, 
according to Van Oudenaren, the Maastricht treaty reflects French preferences about timing and 
German preferences about the conditions 
123
10.  N-NDFs Prevalence in Europeanized Integration: New Central and Eastern 
European Members and their postponement of Entrance into the Eurozone 
. 
 
 
“Euro Fatigue Takes Hold” headlined the Wall Street Journal in 2007, underlining that the 
“[c]ommon currency offers few incentives for new EU members [and] membership in the euro 
zone has failed to generate  significant level of popular enthusiasm” 
124.  The newspaper also 
reported a statement released by the International Monetary Fund arguing that “growing 
skepticism about benefits from euro adoption and reform fatigue [...] contributed to a weakening 
of political support for euro adoption” 
125
As a result, several new Central and Eastern members have abandoned their entry dates 
for adopting the Euro. More precisely, in 2004, with the entrance into the EU of ten new members 
from Central and Eastern Europe, negotiations between the domestic and EU levels aimed at 
. 
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Therefore, another case in which 
Europeanization is made difficult by N-
NDFs is epitomized by new members of 
Central and Eastern Europe who obtained a 
successful entrance delay in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). In these cases, I 
suggest that a lack of integration process 
brought about a forced and subsequently 
unsuccessful Europeanization, thus causing 
almost all the new members to ask for a 
postponement of the Euro adoption. Lack 
of integration means that new members are 
required “to play the game” without 
participating in defining its rules during the 
1990s, when they were outside the Union. 
It means that downloading Europeanization 
forces new members to integrate in an 
already Europeanized context where the 
rules have been previously decided by 
other actors. In fact, they did not take part 
in “uploading” European integration that 
was managed solely by the old EU 
members. Therefore, asking for a 
postponement was the only option they had 
in redefining and negotiating “fit” and 
exercising some sort of power politics in 
bargaining with other members. The whole 
process can be defined as “Europeanized 
Integration”.  
Europeanized Integration confirms the 
theory that for new members, the EU is 
          
     
postponing their entrance into the Eurozone took place. In effect, despite the fact that adoption of 
the Euro was mandatory and the impossibility to “opt out” was precluded, of the new ten 
members, only Slovenia had adopted the Euro in 2007, followed by small members Malta and 
Cyprus in 2008. The absence of big names such as Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 
the Euroclub confirms that convergence and downloading Europeanization are far from being 
completely accomplished. Romania and Bulgaria, new members from 2007, are even expected to 
convert to the Euro without a definite timetable. 
 
 
 
 
more attractive before entering but elusive after the admission
126. Considering that the EU loses 
its coercive power after the accession, “coercive Europeanization” fails. This hypothesis partially 
confirms Dyson’s theory on the discrepancy between the projected enlargement of the EMU to 
new member states and real events 
127
                                                            
126 Dyson, op. cit. 
127 Dyson, K. (2007). “Euro Area entry in East-Central Europe: Paradoxical Europeanisation and Clustered 
convergence”, West European Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3, 417 – 442, May. 
. Europeanized Integration also intercepts the idea of 
paradoxical Europeanization. For Dyson, Europeanization as an explanatory variable for the Euro 
adoption in Eastern and Central Europe has an ambivalent effect: on one hand, limited 
Europeanization; on the other hand, the compulsory adoption of the Euro. Then, Eastern and 
Central governments have evolved political strategies to cope with this forced convergence, 
which Dyson defines as “paradoxical Europeanization” and “clustered convergence”. For Dyson, 
Europeanization is paradoxical because for new members, it is persuasive before, but elusive 
after. Further, clustered convergence means that in the EMU, convergence is visible only in 
Figure 12 – Actors, N-NDFs and dynamics in  
Europeanized integration. 
* With the exception of Slovenia, Malta and 
Cyprus  
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groups of countries, such as the Baltic states (with a pacesetting attitude toward the EMU), the 
Visegrad States (with clustered convergence in business cycle but nominal divergence in the Euro 
accession) and Slovenia (the first and the only entrant at the time of the study) 
128. Europeanized 
Integration moves also in the direction depicted by Grabbe when he argues that Europeanization 
operating in applicant countries is characterized by an asymmetry of power, because they are 
subject to external pressures without the possibility of influencing EU policy-making from the 
inside 
129
Considering that the aim of this paper is to analize the politics of the Euro dynamics, I 
assume that Europeanized Integration is the main political explanation for creating a delay in the 
Euro adoption. However, the literature also analyzes macroeconomic reasons for delaying that are 
only briefly discussed here. To this regard, Tumple-Gugerell and Mooslechner underline the risk 
that policy convergence in a geopolitical periphery like Central and Eastern Europe, where 
countries have to economically catch up with respect to the core members, might become a 
divergence, or, at least, a nominal convergence 
.  
130
The prominent role of member-states is unquestioned in integration, because the first 
raison d’etre of the EU can be identified in state dynamics to create supranational institutions, 
rules and procedures through an intergovernmental method. Old members took more than ten 
years to define the path to monetary union in order to define a true regional integration process. 
For the old members, the supposedly equilibrated evolution of the EU followed the apparent clear 
and logical  path defined by the shift from integration to Europeanization. However, the 
bargaining typical of the integration phase showed discomfort of some states (especially the 
United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and Greece) toward the adoption of a common 
currency, this leading to the tolerance of some exceptional cases where some countries were 
allowed to opt out while others were allowed to be ambivalent. In this sense, I explained Flexible 
Integration, Skeptical Integration, Upward Europeanization and Europeanized Integration as an 
effect of Non-Negotiable Domestic Factors and Partially-Negotiable Domestic Factors. I made 
the reason for this prominence more explicit. Those processes can be depicted as critical theories 
on European Integration and Europeanization that better encompass and normatively synthesize 
the problems in convergence and MLG toward EMU as a response coming from the domestic 
. 
Finally, a mention of the attitude of the European Commission is needed. The EU 
institutions tolerated the UK’s, Denmark’s and Sweden’s refusal to join the Euro but the 
Commission has stated it would not be indulgent on any future members attempting the same 
path. Therefore, “opting out” has become a procedure that the EU was obliged to ban for new 
future members. However, in Europeanized Integration, N-NDFs provoked a prudent reaction by 
the Commission that is now calling for a reevaluation of its attitude toward implementation of 
mandatory accomplishments, such as monetary union. The Commission, in fact, usually promotes 
the EU interests but in this case, it had to retrench and play a moderate role in promoting 
monetary union among its new Central and Eastern members.  
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realms. I proved, then, that problems with integration and Europeanization are not exceptional, 
because their empirical manifestation shows that they have become ordinary. 
I showed that states have much to say about both Integration and Europeanization 
processes because some N-NDFs or P-NDFs prevail. In the cases analyzed here, these factors are 
leaders’ beliefs in the case of the UK, citizens’ beliefs in Denmark and Sweden, goodness of fit in 
Germany, and policy heritage in Italy and Greece. Regarding almost all new Central and Eastern 
member states - with the exceptions of Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus - lack of integration can be 
considered a N-NDFs leading them to ask for an entrance postponement into the Euroarea. New 
members experienced a path to move toward the membership (in terms of potential candidates, 
official candidates and effective members) but they did not negotiate the rules of the games as the 
old members did in the 1990s. This means that for them, Europeanization took place without the 
logic of the previous regional integration process. Therefore, asking for a postponement was the 
only option they had in redefining and negotiating “fit” and exercising some sort of power politics 
in bargaining with other members. This process, which I defined as “Europeanized Integration”, 
expresses the idea that new members are in a different epistemological situation than the old ones, 
because they have to accept all the provisions that come with the entrance into the EU, including 
the adoption of the Euro. However, new members also found room for negotiation, especially 
with the aim to delay their entrance in the Eurozone.  
Furthermore, the problems of member-states’ ability to lead Europeanization, instead of 
the EU, create a paradoxical situation that deserves to be solved theoretically. While member 
nation-states generally have had to adapt to Europe, it is true that the EU in fundamental policy 
areas have had to adapt to members’ input in Europeanization. This paradox makes the 
underpinned relationships in traditional models more complicated. In this sense, the new member-
states’ postponement of monetary union in Europeanization is an emblematic case for two 
reasons. The first is the inversion of the roles in a policy area that is supposed to be exclusively 
managed by the EU. Secondly, it happened in Europeanization, a process which members should 
follow, and not precede, the EU. Therefore, especially in Europeanization, overestimating the role 
of the EU and underestimating the role of member states is a risk. To avoid this, I refused to 
assume a strict, deterministic, unidirectional causation between entities in European Integration 
and Europeanization, by analyzing cases of N-NDFs and P-NDFs in pivotal policy areas such as 
the European monetary union. 
Looking at the conceptual triangle among European integration (“the setting of the rules 
of the game”) Europeanization (to “play the EU game”) and MLG (“where the game is played”) 
the broad picture is not easy to describe, due to the multiple and contemporary interconnections 
between the rules of the game, how the game is played and where it is played. In particular, 
critical examples of Europeanization such as  Europeanized integration, might contribute to a 
different theory explaining the distribution of competences than the one currently believed, 
redirecting relationships, and the role of the actors involved in sharing policy attributions. It is not 
easy to detect the problems in MLG and new studies should address this area especially by 
looking at how new members might contribute to redefining it. To this regard, it might be 
appropriate to look at how the plural set of institutions involved in relevant policy fields, like 
monetary union, modify the issue of the patterns of collaboration among actors in both integration 
and Europeanization. Further, the EMU was intended to be a process of policy convergence and 
institutional reform. However, convergence represented a problematic step in both old and new 
members.  It can be said that for old members, Europeanization represents a second phase 
logically following the first one, which is the regional integration. As a result, EMU in old and 
new members provides great examples of the repercussions of integration and Europeanization on 
convergence that need to be studied more deeply. 
Among the limits of this paper, one might note an absence of measurements of the effects 
provoked by N-NDFs and P-NDFs in European integration and Europeanization. In this sense, it 
might be interesting to create a methodology capable of quantitatively measuring these effects. 
Further, the analysis on the cases that support my theory could be deepened. As a result, concepts  
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and theoretical apparatuses explained here could be defined more precisely. Finally, more needs 
to be said about the effects of flexible integration, skeptical integration and Europeanized 
integration on convergence and MLG theories. 
Finally, I showed the decisive effect of some N-NDFs and P-NDFs. N-NDFs reverberate 
in Flexible Integration and Europeanized Integration, while P-NDFs are echoed in Skeptical 
Integration and Uploading Europeanization. Therefore, the analysis is complicated by the fact that 
European integration and Europeanization can be analyzed alongside or as a part of the same 
whole. However, further investigations on Europeanization should better analyze this domestic 
dimension of Europeanization, by locating the effects and the dynamics they generate, expanding 
the analysis on the cases and underlining the role of the N-NDFs and P-NDFs that are 
dramatically decisive for this sort of the European project. 
 